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Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law Review 
 
Prenuptial Agreements and the Presumption of Free Choice: Issues of 
Power in Theory and Practice, by Sharon Thompson, Oxford, Hart, 2015, 219 
pp., £50, ISBN 9781849465984 
 
In the wake of the Supreme Court decision in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] 
UKSC 42, much ink has been spilled over the enforceability of prenuptial 
agreements when courts are making Financial Orders upon divorce. Questions 
ranged from the interpretation of fairness, or rather unfairness, in this context to 
the level of procedural compliance required by the parties before such 
agreements could influence the court’s exercise of discretion. Thus, at first 
glance, it could be questioned whether Thompson’s monograph, Prenuptial 
Agreements and the Presumption of Free Choice, would provide a new dimension 
or could offer a different perspective on this well-travelled area of law. 
Refreshingly, this book does so effectively by acknowledging from the outset that 
‘the enforceability of prenuptial agreements is not the focus’ and instead ‘it is the 
relationships underpinning them’ (preface). 
 
Encouraged by the seemingly overlooked dissent by Lady Hale in Radmacher, 
Thompson’s objective is to interrogate and expose power inequalities or 
‘expressions’ of power within this context (p. 4). This is a welcome enquiry that 
thankfully shifts the debate away from celebrating respect for autonomy to one 
that questions the darker nature of what Cotterrell (1987) terms ‘private power’ 
and the unique context in which it is exercised. After all, prenuptial agreements 
not only operate in a sphere far removed from the world of commerce but also 
can be further differentiated from commercial deals as the long-term 
consequences of signing a prenuptial agreement are very much unknown at the 
time of formation.  
 
In order to better understand this context, Thompson draws upon traditional 
contract theory, in particular the viewing of contracts as manifestations of 
autonomy, and identifies numerous limitations of this approach. Crucially, the 
main limitation is that exercises of power in the signing of the prenuptial 
agreement often fall short of duress or undue influence, which, in turn, are facts 
largely ignored by contract law. As Thompson notes: ‘in many cases, the court is 
desensitised to more subtle power imbalances’ (p. 197). Using feminist theory as 
a counter-perspective to contract law, Thompson isolates and articulates 
overlooked gendered inequalities that so often get marginalised when courts 
prioritise what they deem to be solemn bargains, carefully struck by informed 
adults.  
 
The book is comprised of six substantive chapters. Chapter One commences with 
a detailed exposition of Radmacher and challenges the problematic reasoning of 
the Supreme Court. In particular, it questions what Thompson sees as support 
for the ‘liberal view of choice’ (p. 36) that presupposes a neutral bargaining 
process unaffected by context when parties are signing a prenuptial agreement. 
Drawing upon a close analysis of post-Radmacher case law, Thompson 
challenges the seemingly false dichotomy between judicial paternalism (viewed 
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negatively and seen as a thing of the past) versus respect for autonomy (seen as 
modern and progressive). These findings are then mapped onto the developing 
landscape of financial provision in Chapter Two. Here a feminist and historical 
analysis of early property ownership in marriage is adopted, which then shifts to 
the modern position with Thompson reiterating that any ‘enforceability’ of 
prenuptial agreements derives from the discretion of the court and not the 
agreement itself. Two minor remarks can be made on this Chapter. Firstly, it may 
seem a little unusual to analyse the default regime for division of assets in 
Chapter Two, after the exceptions to that regime had already been explored in 
Chapter One. Secondly, the interesting discussion of non-matrimonial property 
on page 67 could have been developed as an internal countervailing force to the 
‘sharing exercise’ that, in some ways, echoes prenuptial agreements as parties 
are again seeking to ring-fence assets (albeit here at the date of judgment). 
 
Chapter Three moves to New York and analyses the practical application of 
prenuptial agreements in that jurisdiction. Although Thompson accepts that the 
problems may not be the same in the UK and New York, she posits several 
valuable insights through the use of excerpts from practitioner interviews. 
Thompson’s use of practitioner perspectives throughout the book offers helpful 
vignettes that develop the theme of power and in many ways operate as warning 
signs for the future development of prenuptial agreements in this jurisdiction. 
Unlike the position in England and Wales, the fact that prenuptial agreements in 
New York are ‘contracts, through and through’ (p. 103) sets up the analysis of 
contractual principles in Chapter Four. This chapter interrogates traditional 
vitiating factors such as duress and undue influence alongside unconscionability 
and reveals that they are ill-equipped to deal with ‘frequent and subtle 
imbalances of power’ (p. 12). Indeed, their high threshold for application means 
that routinely ‘equal power is often presumed in practice’ (p. 129). 
 
The final two chapters are undoubtedly the most interesting and ambitious. 
Thompson begins Chapter Five by rejecting traditional contract theory and 
instead replaces it with relational contract law married with feminist theory. 
Here the aim is explicit; namely, ‘to make visible the gender dimension of 
prenups obscured by orthodox contract law’ (p. 130). What is particularly 
welcome is Thompson confronting the perceived limitations of relational 
contract theory but then noting that implementation of her proposal does not 
necessarily require an overhaul of existing contract law as ‘pre-existing 
relational elements’ in contract law could be built upon (p. 163). In her final 
Chapter, Thompson concludes by translating this endeavour from theory into 
practice. By revisiting Radmacher, she again exposes the judicial tendency of 
assuming autonomy and notes the problematic trend of evaluating the fairness of 
an agreement separately to any analysis of autonomy. Interestingly, it is 
questioned whether under a different imagining of autonomy, the courts may 
state that ‘respect for autonomy is reason not to give effect to a prenup, because 
the parties’ intentions are not represented in the terms of the agreement’ (p. 
194). These insights are particularly illuminating as they start the process of 
generating alternative accounts of autonomy and underline Herring’s 
observation that independence and freedom may be currently de rigueur but, in 
family law, they are perhaps ‘false gods’ (p. 36) (Herring 2014).  
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Prenuptial Agreements and the Presumption of Free Choice is not merely a 
doctrinal analysis of the modern approach to prenuptial agreements in England 
and Wales. Instead, and by situating the focus within general contract law 
scholarship and feminist theory, Thompson makes important analytical and 
empirically-informed connections that have hitherto been underdeveloped. In 
addition, Thompson offers a timely reminder of the dangers of autonomy and the 
risks created by the majority’s ringing endorsement of that concept in 
Radmacher.  
 
In light of England and Wales entering an era of even more contractualisation 
and private ordering, courts may have fewer opportunities to police expressions 
of private power. Similarly, when cases are litigated, the well-documented 
limitations of relational contract theory, let alone feminist relational contract 
theory, may prove too academic to revolutionise practice. Yet those practical 
factors should not be seen as diminishing the value of Thompson’s analytical, 
thought-provoking and well-researched monograph. Ultimately, Thompson’s 
core message that there is always inequality of bargaining power in prenuptial 
agreements is an important one. Building upon comparative law insights, it is 
very much hoped that Thompson’s detailed contribution will prompt a re-
conceptualisation of autonomy in this specific context and that the use of judicial 
discretion may exhibit a greater sensitivity to exercises of gendered power.  
 
Andy Hayward 
Durham Law School 
a.p.hayward@durham.ac.uk  
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